Plan for Week 9:  The Metaphysics of Intentionality

Sellars's strategy in *SM* to present *scientia mensura* scientific realism as a Kantian transcendental idealism. MI is phenomenal appearance and SI says what material things are in themselves.

## I.        A Brief History of Conceptions of the Appearance/Reality Distinction

From *Resemblance* to *Representation*:
        From Atomistic to Holistic Conceptions of Appearance/Reality

1.        *Resemblance* (Plato, Aristotle, Scholastics).
2.        The New Science (Galileo, Descartes) not intelligible as Resemblance.
Response:
3.        *Representation* (Descartes, fully explicit in Kant).
                The model of Cartesian algebraic geometry.
4.        Holistic Character of Representation (Spinoza out of Descartes).

*Two Structural-Categorial Models* of Intentional Nexus of Representing and Represented

A)        Two Senses in which *Objects* (Particulars Referred to by *Terms*) *Exist*:

1.        *Formal* vs. *Objective* Existence of Material Objects (Descartes out of Scholastics).
2.        Simple Existence (Reality) vs.
          Existence *in* Represent*ings* or *as* Represent*ed* or Represent*able* (Appearance).
3.        Sellars on Descartes and Kant on Appearance and Reality in Terms of Representation.
          "Appearances and Things in Themselves: Material Objects" *SM* Ch. II.
          [**Main Segment, via Passages**.]
4.        The argument from illusion.  McDowell's response.

Alternative Model:
B)        Thought as Inner Speech:Taking seriously the "the character by virtue of which [a representing] represents what it represents" (§3).
Fitting this into the history of the concept of representation:
Holism, Normativity, and Sentential Content.

Why Declarative Sentences Matter.
C)        Two Senses in which *Thoughts* (Claimables-Judgeables, Expressed by *Sentences*) *Hold*:
          Two Forms Judgeable Contents Can Occur In.
1.        Claimables-first Order of Explanation (Kant, Frege, Wittgenstein).
2.        True vs. Taken-True, Fact vs. Attitude, Holds vs. Held.

## II.        From Truth to Correspondence of Appearance with Reality

1.        Truth and Reference a matter of Semantics: Metalinguistic Inferences,

So Cannot be the Connection between Appearance and Reality.
2.       Matter-of-Factual *Picturing*:  of Constellations of Nonlinguistic Particulars
by Constellations of Linguistic Particulars.

Introduction:
1. For very beginning of seminar session:
   a) We are investigating the concept of <u>appearance</u> that Sellars articulates in terms of the inheritance from Descartes, and
   b) attributes to Kant
   c) as the fixed end of his constructive attempt to display the normative common-sense conceptual framework as analogous to Kant's "appearance" and the conceptual scheme of an eventual natural science as analogous to Kant's "things in themselves" noumenal reality, so as to present his own *scientific naturalism* as a version of Kant's *transcendental idealism*.  He wants to conclude that the common-sense normative conceptual framework is empirically real but transcendentally ideal.  (This is where he gets in PSIM.)
   d) But then, in *SM*, he wants to say that *we* (and not just God) can also understand the sense in which the common-sense conceptual framework, in its descriptions and explanations, presents *appearances of* things in themselves.
   e)  That is why he needs an "identity-like relation" between scientific realities and their appearances in the descriptions and explanations of the common-sense framework.  That will be "picturing" as a matter-of-factual (so, *real*) relation

Sellars's story is an intricate one:
   a) Descartes, and the model of containment, including two senses of the *existence* of *objects*.
   b) Kant, and his transcendental idealism understood in terms of the Cartesian-Scholastic model of conceptual content as a matter of representings containing objects 'in' them.
   c) Sellars's own eventual version of transcendental idealism as the scientific realism of the *scientia mensura*.
   d) His version differs from Kant's in that:
      i.      We can know things in themselves (though we don't yet).
      ii.     Natural science operates on the level of things-in-themselves, not exclusively on the side of appearances.
      iii.    We can also come to know the relations between them in virtue of which the phenomenal *appearances* to us in the conceptual framework of common sense of the noumenal *realities* are appearances *of* those realities.  This is picturing.
      iv.    That picturing relation is itself part of noumenal reality, and as such is accessible to us via natural science.

**A Brief History of Conceptions of the Appearance/Reality Distinction**

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Appearance and Reality: Resemblance.

The paradigm case seems to be observation by the senses.
The **two constraints on the relations between appearance and reality** would seem to be:
   i.      Sometimes things do not appear as they really are.
   ii.     Sometimes things do appear as they really are.
(But at the dawn of philosophy, Plato already denies that sensuously presented things appear as
they really (intelligibly) are

Start with a **brief history of the appearance/reality distinction**:
   a) tell my amplified Haugelandian story about the move from resemblance to representation.
      i.      Resemblance conceptions.  Aristotelian forms are a paradigm (but Platonic ideas,
              too).
              Key is shared individual (atomistically construed) properties.  *Shared* properties,
              not just *corresponding* properties, as in *literal* picturing.
      ii.     Copernicus account of what was real and what apparent (real motion, apparent
              rest; real rotation, apparent revolution), then Galileo's mathematization:
              appearance of period of time is the length of a line, appearance of real
              acceleration is area of a triangle.  Resemblance account no help here.
      iii.    Descartes's invention of notion of representation.  Model for him is his algebraic
              geometry.  He thinks of the material real as *consisting* of geometric properties
              (radicalizing Galileo by reading an *ontology* into Galileo's geometric vocabulary),
              and they can be *represented* (indeed, *perfectly*) by equations that do not at all
              resemble them in the sense of sharing properties with them.
      iv.     Spinoza (whose first book was on Descartes) realizes how this works in
              Descartes, drawing a *holist* conclusion about isomorphic "attributes of substance",
              under the rubric "the order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and
              connection of things."  Descartes himself never drew this holist-because-
              functionalist philosophical conclusion from his modeling of the relations between

3

mind and bodies on the relations between algebra and geometry. But Spinoza's diagnosis is compelling.

<u>*Two Structural-Categorial Models* of Intentional Nexus of Representing and Represented</u>

(A)  Two Senses in which *Objects* (Particulars Referred to by *Terms*) *Exist*:

5.    *Formal* vs. *Objective* Existence of Material Objects (Descartes out of Scholastics).
6.    Simple Existence (Reality) vs.
      Existence *in* Represent*ings* or *as* Represent*ed* or Represent*able* (Appearance).
7.    Sellars on Descartes and Kant on Appearance and Reality in Terms of Representation.
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8.    The argument from illusion.  McDowell's response.

According to the argument of *SM*: The protasis of the *scientia mensura* should not say "In the dimension of describing and explaining…".  It should say "In the dimension of describing and explaining *material objects*…".  Further, "material objects" are "this-suches" that meet further strenuous conditions.  Stock markets, prices, and moods are not included.  For *much*, perhaps *most* of the "describing and explaining" that goes on in the "conceptual framework of common sense" concerns items that are *not* material objects, and so not in the world in the narrow sense.  Sellars will not see them as real, nor as picturing, hence as not having "counterparts" in the Peircean natural scientific framework.

For (7):
      1)  Main topic of Week 9 is Chapter II of *SM*.
Main order of business should be to rehearse various ways of understanding the distinction between 'existence *in* a representing' and 'existence *simpliciter*.'
Mostly, the issue is how to understand the former.
What is existence *in* the conceptual content of a representing?
If we consider sense/reference as the key, will need to distinguish two roles of Fregean *Sinne*: reference-fixing and being what one who understands the expression grasps.

<u>Passages from *SM* Chapter II</u>:

Chapter II.  **Appearances and Things In Themselves:  Material Things**

Descartes, as is well known, found it appropriate to classify the representations of sense with the representations of conceptual thinking proper as *cogitationes.* The fact that both can be characterized as representations…**tempted him to apply to the humbler species the epistemological and ontological categories he applied to conceptual thinking proper**, **not simply in the spirit of analogy, the positive being counterbalanced by the negative, but literally, the negative analogy being construed as specific difference**.  [2]

This second sentence is incredibly rich.  It sketches a deep diagnosis of Descartes's over-reaching and thereby offers a model of a kind of mistake one can make elsewhere.

The assimilation of sense impressions to thoughts by Descartes, about which Sellars makes the pregnant, insightful remark in §2:

a) **Is the result of the observation he makes in §8, that he thinks of all mental acts as of the same kind: the kind, namely, that *contains* objects in the sense of representing them. Being a representing is being a *container* in that distinctive sense**. The difference of kind between things that can be contained (for instance, the difference between containing pictures and containing sentences, or between containing material objects and containing representational containers) is not ontologically important.

b) This assimilation shaped the two strands of post-Cartesian Early Modern thought, usually picked out as Continental Rationalists (Spinoza and Leibniz) and British Empiricists (Locke, Berkeley, and Hume). They both accepted the Cartesian assimilation of thoughts and sense impressions.

Both saw a *continuum*, with thoughts at one end and impressions of sense at the other.

   i.   Rationalists took as the paradigm thoughts, models of distinctness, and understood sense impressions as, in effect, confused, indistinct thoughts.

   ii.  Empiricists took sense impressions as the paradigm, as concrete and particular, and understood thoughts as abstract and general, entertained by ignoring differences among the sense impressions and running them together.

So much is Kantian conventional wisdom about these traditions.

Then Kant re-introduces the Aristotelian-Scholastic distinction, and worries about how they are related.

But, crucially, he does so in the context of *judgments*, thought of as having essentially *sentential* (and so *logical*) structure.

This is not yet endorsing the thought-as-inner-speech model, but it is getting essential elements of it.

c) I think these two preKantian Early Modern traditions are better distinguished as those who got the essentially *holistic* character of representation (Spinoza, Leibniz) and those who did not, and remained *atomists*.

d) I have also suggested that the distinction is better made in terms of their semantic primitives, dividing them into *inferentialists* and *representationalists*. That is not wrong, but the rationalists also used representation. They just did not think of them atomistically.

These 3 can all come apart: holism, normativity, and LoT. Consider Fodor, who only has LoT, but atomistic and nonnormative, because not modeled on outer speech.

The first set of categories distinguishes between:

(a) A representation *qua* act, i.e. qua represent*ing* or 'operation of the mind';

(b) The character by virtue of which it represents what it represents; and,

(c) Where appropriate, the substance or modification of which the represent*ing*, *qua* representing what it represents, is true.

Closely related to the above is a contrast between two ways in which things or substances and their modifications can exist:

(a) They can exist 'in' mental acts of representing—i.e. they can be, in Descartes' phrase 'the **objective** reality of an idea' by which, he tells us, he understands 'the entity or being of the thing represented by the idea, ins so far as the entity is in the idea.'

(b) They can, as I shall put it, exist *simpliciter*. In Descartes' terminology, 'the same things are to be said **formally** in the object of the ideas when they are in them such as they are conceived'. [3] (Emphasis added.)

The first set of distinctions is related to the second as follows:

(1) For a thing or modification to exist 'in' a mental act is for the latter to represent it.

(2) A mental act representing a modification is true of a substance which exists *simpliciter* if and only if the modification exists *simpliciter* as a modification of the substance. [5]

Descartes had in front of him the model of his algebraic geometry.
And that *was* crucial for him conceiving the new, more abstract notion of <u>representation</u> (which was *one* component of the assimilation of sensings to thinkings—the other being the pure being-a-container view of mental representings).
But he did *not* think *mental* representings were like equations.
They were *pure* representings, distinguished *only* by their representational contents.

Two final remarks on these Cartesian categories before we apply them to Kant.
[First remark:] We distinguished above between a representing *qua* act and a representing *qua* representing something. Since the latter tends to be construed on **the model of container to thing contained**, the question naturally arises as to what character a 'containing' act might have in addition to its relational property of 'containing' an idea. . **The dominant Cartesian view seems to have been that *intrinsically* all basic mental acts are alike—all instances, so to speak, of mental-actness.** (One is reminded of Moore's diaphanous acts.) [8]
This feature contrasts sharply with a thought-as-inner-speech model, where the different thoughts differ by the different sentences that are "spoken in the heart." *All* that distinguishes different thinkings is what they *contain*: the objects that exist *in* the representation.

[Second remark:]
Here Sellars introduces the distinction that is the second half of my story about the history of the appearance/reality distinction: the opposition between the represented *objects* picture, working at the level of *singular terms*, and one that understands the contents of cognitive states as expressed by *sentences* (sayables).

Modern philosophers are often tempted to **construe Descartes as, so to speak, a 'thought-is-inner-speech' philosopher** *manqué*—to interpret him, that is, in a way which construes the *inesse* of ideas in mental acts as though it were a matter of acts being tokens (utterances in one's heart) of Mentalese words and sentences. It is clear, however, that the feeling for the logical forms of thought, so clear in disciples of Ockham, and which revives in Leibniz and, above all, Kant, is almost totally lacking in Descartes and his British successors. A clear interpretation of intellectual *cogitationes* as 'inner speech' would have made more difficult, if not impossible, many of the exasperating confusions which are characteristic of pre-Kantian philosophy, and by no means totally lacking in Kant.

Thus it is exactly the 'containing' model which permitted the Cartesian blurring of the distinction between sensible and conceptual representations… [10-11]

The root notion of 'existing in itself' is that of existing *simpliciter* as contrasted with existing *as represented*, i.e. existing 'in' a representing or as 'idea'. Clearly represent*ings* (conceptual or nonconceptual) as well as non-represent*ings* may be represent*ed*. Thus we can distinguish:
(1a) non-representings *qua* existing *simpliciter*;
(1b) representings *qua* existing *simpliciter*;
(2a) represented non-representings *qua* represented;
(2b) represented representings *qua* represented. [12]

Let us now introduce the term 'in itself' for anything, representing or not, which exists *simpliciter*, *as* existing *simpliciter*; and let us use the term 'content' for anything, representing or not, **which exists 'in' a representing,** *qua* **so doing**. [13]

Thus we must add that an appearance is an individual which, though it exists primarily as represent*ed* and secondarily as represent*able*, cannot exist *simpliciter* (i.e. in itself). **Thus, an individual which is an appearance cannot be identical with anything which exists** *simpliciter***.** [22]
This is the key feature of this objects-as-existing-in-two-ways model of the relations between representing and represented. I want to say it is the *fatal* feature.
Sellars agrees. This is the point at which *his* version of Kant's Transcendental Idealism (TI) will differ from Kant's: there is an intelligible-by-us real (in the narrow sense of the SI) "identity-like" relation (picturing) between the appearances of the MI descriptions of material things and the realities specified by the SI.
We'll see that the classical **argument from illusion** articulates and exploits this line of thought.

It has often been noted that when Kant is smoothing the path for his non-critical readers he tends to say *not* that we know *appearances* but that we know things (in themselves) *as they appear to us*. On the whole, however, his considered formulation is that we know appearances. [32]

A 'transcendental realist', as Kant uses this term, holds that, misperception aside, intuitively represented objects and events exist *simpliciter* as well as 'in' representings. [43]

"Kant's phenomenalism can be put, in first approximation, by saying that physical objects and events exist *only* 'in' certain actual and obtainable conceptual representings…
A phenomenalism which construes the physical world as a system of available contents in *this* sense differs radically from a phenomenalism which construes the world as a system of available sense impressions, for it construes physical appearances as *irreducibly* physical. It differs from physical realism by denying that these appearances have more than 'objective' or 'representative' being." [46]

"The thesis I wish to defend, but not ascribe to Kant, though it is very much a 'phenomenalism' in the Kantian (rather than the Berkeleyan) sense, is that although the world we conceptually represent in experience exists only in actual and obtainable representings of it, we can say, from a transcendental point of view, not only that existence-in-itself accounts for this obtainability by virtue of having a certain analogy with the world we represent, but also that in principles *we*, rather than God alone, can provide the cash." [49]

"Perhaps the most interesting argument for the transcendental ideality of the represented world is what might be called the argument from the transcendental ideality of the categories. It goes somewhat as follows:

> Premise I: The categorial forms are forms of what exists in representings, as so existing.
> Premise II: What exists in itself does not, as so existing, exist in conceptual representings.
>   Conclusion I: The categorial forms are not forms of what exists in itself, as so existing.
> Premise III: The physical world exists 'in' conceptual representings.
>   Conclusion II: The physical world as existing 'in' conceptual representings has categorial form.
>   Conclusion III: The physical world has categorial form.
>   Conclusion IV: The physical world does not exist in itself.

I have spelled out the argument in such a way as to make it clear that it is formally fallacious. The invalid step is the move from Conclusion II to Conclusion III. Yet although the argument is fallacious, and, more interestingly, *although Kant never uses it*, it is one of the persistent myths of Kant scholarship. Most of the puzzles about 'Do the categories apply to things in themselves?' rest on a tacit appeal to the following 'principle':

> Nothing which as conceptually represented has categorial form can exist *simpliciter* or in itself. [76]

This fallacious and quite un-Kantian principle would require, for example, that since things-in-themselves have categorial form as represented, they cannot exist in themselves!" [77]

The fallacious move here is to infer from the fact that the physical world *as represented* (as it appears) has a certain property (categorial structure) the physical world *as it is in itself* (in the world in the narrow sense) cannot exist.

You might agree that such a view is mistaken, but also think that it is just silly and does not require all the heavy lifting Sellars is doing to get to that conclusion.
But there is a more modern version that is not so easily dismissed.

Re (8):
On the opposition between McD's "disjunctivism" and "highest common factor" theories.


 McDowell's disjunctivist response to the argument from illusion
In 'Criteria, Defeasability, and Knowledge', McDowell presents the argument from illusion has follows:
"In a deceptive case, what is embraced within the scope of experience is an appearance that such-and-such is the case, falling short of the fact: a *mere* appearance.
So what is experienced in a non-deceptive case is a mere appearance too.
The upshot is that even in the non-deceptive cases we have to picture something that falls short of the fact ascertained, at best defeasibly connected with it, as interposing itself between the experiencing subject and the fact itself." (386)

McD suggests the following response:

"But suppose we say -- not at all unnaturally -- that an appearance that such and such is the case can be *either* a mere appearance *or* the fact that such and such is the case making itself perceptually manifest to someone. As before, the object of experience in the deceptive cases is a mere appearance. But we are not to accept that in the non-deceptive cases too the object of experience is a mere appearance, and hence something that falls short of the fact itself. ...So appearances are no longer conceived as in general intervening between the experiencing subject and the world." (386-7)

"The most obvious attraction [of anti-disjunctivist views] is the phenomenological argument: the occurrence of deceptive cases is experientially indistinguishable from non-deceptive cases." (389)
Objection:
"...a mere appearance can be indistinguishable from what you describe as a fact made manifest. So in a given case one cannot tell for certain whether what confronts one is one or the other of those. How, then, can there be a difference in what is given in experience, in any sense that could matter to epistemology?" (389-90)
The assumption which underwrites this objection: facts which do not make a difference to 'how it seems' to an agent cannot affect one's epistemic standing.

BB: But there *can* be a difference in epistemic standing as viewed from the second- or third-person context of critical *assessment* of, for instance, whether one knows.  From this point of view, one could be right even though one can't tell when one is right.

Q: But could one be *justified*, and so *know*, in the case where all goes right?

Comparing two representings, one of whose represented objects exists objectively and the other of which does not (the golden mountain), it seems that we cannot tell just from the representing which is which.  "*As represented*," the difference in the *objective* status of what is represented does not seem to be (immediately) detectable by the representer (subject whose representings they are).

This is the set-up for the argument from illusion, which invites McDowell's deconstruction of it.  The argument from illusion starts from the side of the representings, and argues that since veridical and illusory representings are (can be) subjectively indistinguishable, what they (and even whether they) represent something *objective*, something that simply exists, is no part of the *content* of the representings—of *any* representings, even the veridical one.  That relation to an objective represented is wholly outside representings.

This is a "two-factor" account.

It concludes that what is represented as it is "in" (contained in) the representing is *never identical to* the represented as it objectively exists.  These are two different kinds of existence.

<u>The Alternative View is the one Sellars mentions in §8: The thought-as-inner-speech model</u>.

<u>Background</u>:

a)   In PSIM, Sellars put forward a view of transcendental idealism as scientific realism. On that view, the MI is *just* appearance (things as they are *in* representings), and the SI is things as they are in themselves.  So, the objects of the MI don't really exist.  They are phenomenal.

b)   The big change to *SM* is that he wants to find a way to say that the things of the common-sense framework *are* the things of the eventual SI.  They are tied to those things by picturing relations (not traditional semantic relations of truth and reference, which he understands as intralinguistic and functional-classificatory, rather than relational) which we, not just God, can know about, and so can be understood as appearances *of* those things-in-themselves (world in narrow sense).

c)   To do that, and appreciate picturing, we have to move *away* from the "diaphanous" (Moore), vehicleless Cartesian view and to a thought-as-speech model.  For that focuses us on "the features of the representing in virtue of which the represented object is *contained in it*."  Those are features of the thinking-as-speaking vehicle.  Sellars thinks of those representings as Jumblese arrangements of particulars.  The particulars in those arrangements are intelligible as singular terms picturing nonlinguistic particulars in virtue of the functional role they play in the *inferences* relating the *sentential* sign-designs formed from the linguistic particulars.

d)   Q:  So what is the point of laying out the Scholastic Cartesian model of representing, and diagnosing Kant as still working with it (even though he has contrary lines of thought in play, too)?

e)   A:  It is to explain how Kant could *mistakenly* (as Sellars now, in *SM* thinks, as opposed to Sellars's view in PSIM, which went along with this Kantian line) have thought that *nothing* that exists *in* representings can exist *simpliciter*.  He wants to take over a TI sort of view, but divide through by the unknowability in principle of things in themselves. But to do so, he wants us to understand its source in the Scholastic-Cartesian model of appearance/reality as representation.

f)   On this story, it is crucial that Descartes *never* understood the holist lesson that Spinoza drew by thinking about the model of the relation of algebra to geometry as what motivates Descartes on the relation of discursive thought to extended substance. For that holistic-functionalist model ultimately depends on thinking about the mental representations as having the structure of discursive statings.  But neither Spinoza, nor Leibniz, both of whom got the holist point, went this far.  (Leibniz does have the internal spectrum of degrees of adequacy of each monad's perceptions to do the same work in defining a global isomorphism that the internal structure of algebraic expressions performs in Descartes' analytic geometry.  So Leibniz was *very* close on this point.  He

didn't get the normativity.)  That is the second model, thought-as-inner-speech, which was *not* the one Descartes himself used, even though he made a great case for it.

g)  For the Scholastic-Cartesian containment model *retains* from the resemblance model the idea of *atomistic* properties of what are now more abstractly conceived representings.  It is just that those properties are *not* worldly properties, but *sui generis* representational properties: a matter of what they *contain*.  *As* representings, they have these distinctive representational properties, namely representational *contents*.  Some objects are *in* them in a distinctive, intentional way.  That is what makes them, the representings, the distinctive kind of thing *they* are: that they have these representational features or properties: they *contain* other things, in this distinctive representational sense.
The Scholastic-Cartesian model is like the resemblance model, is a continuation of it, in looking to atomistic properties of the representings (appearances).  But instead of *shared* worldly properties (forms), it sees representings as having *sui generis* representational atomistic properties.  Representings are thoughts, which have the mysterious property of being *tanquam rem*, "as if of things".  That is understood as *containing* the thing, in the objective mode.

h)  In this regard, in the view he will propose *instead of* the Scholastic-Cartesian (and still Kantian) "containment" model, Sellars is *returning* to the ancient traditional resemblance model, in the form he endorses in "Being and Being Known."  But he *does* go holistic with the idea that what establishes the picturing relation that ties representings to representeds is the functional roles (meaning as functional classification) the linguistic particulars (terms in Jumblese) play in *inferential* relations among the *sentences* they occur in.  The Scholastic-Cartesian *mistake* was to think that that tie was a simple, atomistic property of the representing: a matter of what it *contains*.  What is most misleading about that model is that what *one* representing *contains* is independent of what *other* representings *contain*.  Knowing what is in this bucket doesn't tell you about what is in that bucket.

i)  This is a way of *naturalizing* representations.  They are not some special kind of thing with unique monadic representational containment properties.  They are constellations of particulars that play certain functional inferential roles.  This is most evident for speech— the model of thought.  For spoken or written sentences have sign-designs that have nonintentional specifications as natural linguistic objects.

j)  It is because the representational properties of sign-designs (in the thought-as-inner-speech model) are *holistic*, because *functional* properties [Working this out later will be an excuse to present the material on Lewisian functionalism as Ramsification plus best-realizers.] rather than unique "intentional containment" atomistic properties that Sellars

needs to emphasize that what is governed by *norms* therefore and thereby exhibits induced matter-of-factual *regularities*, which can be appealed to in defining the picturing relations to represented material reality.

k) It is a further twist that Sellars does *not* think of the representational relations between appearance and reality as a *semantic* relation. For him, semantic relations of truth and reference all *intra*linguistic: a matter of inference and (though he doesn't work out the details) substitution *salva consequentia.* None of that is happening in the world in the narrow sense. It is all about us. But representation-as-picturing is the real relation between conceptual appearance and material reality—which for him does *not* have conceptual shape, since conceptual shape for him is normative functional role (and semantic relations are a matter of classifying such roles), and that is wholly on the side of language.

l) So the point of rehearsing the Scholastic-Cartesian model is
   i.      to show us how weird it is,
   ii.     to explain how Kant could have been led to the mistaken view that there cannot be *veridical* appearances of real things-in-themselves: that whatever is empirically real must be trancendentally ideal, that appearance and reality are disjoint.
   iii.    To set up the contrast with his own view.

6.     A third way. McD on "Criteria, Defeasibility, and Knowledge":
a) I was going to tell McD's story as fitting in with the truth-of-sentences rather than existence-of-objects story, since the latter makes on a patsy for argument-from-illusion skepticism.
b) But in fact, McD is opposed to the kind of story Sellars will tell, lining up functional features of representings with features of representeds. Or at least, it is not easy to see how to reconcile them.
c) McD has a *third* approach, going *beyond* Sellars.
d) One way to see that is that Sellars's thought-as-language model permits the formulation of a version of the argument from illusion, just as much as the Scholastic-Cartesian containment model does. It is true that its emphasis on inferential relations among sentences leaves room for an understanding of worldly facts as expressed by sentences, but Sellars rejects the idea of worldly facts. So *he* does not go *that* way.
e) McD's disjunctivism is compatible with the vehiclelessness of intentional states, as Sellars's account emphatically is not.
f) I would like to entitle myself to say some of the things McD says, but in something like the Sellars framework. But that is a big project. The key is to see *both* sides of the appearance/reality divide as conceptually structured. McD does and I do. This is the fundamental *Hegelian* move: *conceptual realism*, as opposed to *transcendental idealism*.

g) **Sellars is more traditional, and in a box with Kant and the Scholastic-Cartesian tradition, in putting the conceptual wholly on the side of appearance, representings**. The move to the third model is the move to fact-stating understood as conceptual on both the side of the statement and the side of the fact, since the statable they share, what is stated and what is true, is in conceptual shape.

h) So the excuse for introducing the McD argument would be to point ahead to this other way to go, this other sort of conception of appearance/reality, as conceptual on both sides of the divide. **Where Sellars finds an image of the nonconceptual world in picturing representations of it, so pointing to an assimilation at the *nonconceptual* level, McD and I will see both sides as in conceptual shape**.

i) This difference is what I was after (only dimly seeing it) in contrasting the *sentential* expression of statables (which when true are facts) with the Scholastic-Cartesian two-modes-of-existence-of-objects containment in representings and containment in reality model.

j) Sellars's thought-as-inner-speech successor to the Scholastic-Cartesian model only takes us part-way to the conceptual-on-both-sides third picture.

7.     The Scholastic-Cartesian (S-C) approach has an answer to what it is for a feature of a representing A to be an appearance of an object O:  it is for them to be different modes of existence, objective and formal, in the representing and in the world, of the *same* object. **But this is an *ontological* answer (invoking identity or an identity-like relation).  It carries no *epistemological* weight**, once it is moved from the neo-Aristotelean resemblance to the Cartesian representational frame. For the whole point of the latter is to give up the idea of local properties ('form') shared by the two.  And without that, there is nothing.
(We need to move to the idea that what is shared is a global isomorphism, not a local one, but neither RD nor Kant are there yet.)  Spinoza is, without the thought-as-inner-speech model, and without normativity of the "order and connection of ideas", and similarly for Leibniz.  Only with Hegel will the normativity and holism come together—and does he have the thought-as-speech model?  I think so, only for him thought takes place in speech.  It is not that he has a speech-first model.  It is that he simply doesn't care about "inner" speech.  If asked if silent thought was the inwardized version of outward speech, I expect he would say "Of course."

8.     The assimilation of sense impressions to thoughts by Descartes, about which Sellars makes the pregnant, insightful remark in §2:

e) **Is the result of the observation he makes in §8, that he thinks of all mental acts as of the same kind: the kind, namely, that *contains* objects in the sense of representing them.  Being a representing is being a *container* in that distinctive sense**.  The difference of kind between things that can be contained (for instance, the difference between containing pictures and containing sentences, or between containing material objects and containing representational containers) is not ontologically important.

f) This assimilation shaped the two strands of post-Cartesian Early Modern thought, usually picked out as Continental Rationalists (Spinoza and Leibniz) and British Empiricists (Locke, Berkeley, and Hume). They both accepted the Cartesian assimilation of thoughts and sense impressions.

Both saw a *continuum*, with thoughts at one end and impressions of sense at the other.

    iii. Rationalists took as the paradigm thoughts, models of distinctness, and understood sense impressions as, in effect, confused, indistinct thoughts.

    iv. Empiricists took sense impressions as the paradigm, as concrete and particular, and understood thoughts as abstract and general, entertained by ignoring differences among the sense impressions and running them together.

So much is Kantian conventional wisdom about these traditions.

Then Kant re-introduces the Aristotelian-Scholastic distinction, and worries about how they are related.

But, crucially, he does so in the context of *judgments*, thought of as having essentially *sentential* (and so *logical*) structure.

This is not yet endorsing the thought-as-inner-speech model, but it is getting essential elements of it.

g) I think these two preKantian Early Modern traditions are better distinguished as those who got the essentially *holistic* character of representation (Spinoza, Leibniz) and those who did not, and remained *atomists*.

h) I have also suggested that the distinction is better made in terms of their semantic primitives, dividing them into *inferentialists* and *representationalists*. That is not wrong, but the rationalists also used representation. They just did not think of them atomistically.

9. These 3 can all come apart: holism, normativity, and LoT. Consider Fodor, who only has LoT, but atomistic and nonnormative, because not modeled on outer speech.

Looking forward, when we consider the contents of thoughts in terms of *sentences*, with all the logical structure they can have:

D)  Two Senses in which *Thoughts* (Claimables-Judgeables, Expressed by *Sentences*) *Hold*:
    Two Forms Judgeable Contents Can Occur In.

3.  Claimables-first Order of Explanation (Kant, Frege, Wittgenstein)
4.  True vs. Taken-True, Fact vs. Attitude, Holds vs. Held.

The way of thinking about intentionality, the appearance/reality distinction and relation, and representation that Sellars traces as a Scholastic idea, from Descartes to Kant, is based on the *objects* that can *exist* in two ways: simply and *in* representings (or *as* representables). 'Object' here means: what *singular terms* purport to refer to or represent, *particulars*. This was indeed the classical approach.

Kant:
But beginning with Kant (who, Sellars is right, also inherits and deploys the other model of representation and appearance), we get the idea that the basic unit of conceptual content is the *judgeable*—as part of the view that cognitive activity consists in *judgings*.
*Particulars* show up only as intuitions, which are both particulars (as representing episodes) and reprsentings *of* particulars.  And we are to understand intuitions as *functions* of judgments, that is in functional terms of the role they play in judgments.
Frege:
This *primacy of the propositional* is taken up and championed by Frege, for whom declarative sentences are fundamental because they are the only linguistic units to which *pragmatic force* can attach—paradigmatically, *assertional* force.  They are what can be used to *say* something, especially in the fundamental sense of *claiming* something—making a *statement*.
Wittgenstein:
We have seen that the Wittgenstein of the *Tractatus* focuses on facts, and understands objects only in their role as constituents of facts.
The later Wittgenstein maintains this theme in singling out sentences as pragmatically primary, in that they are the only linguistic expressions that can be "used to make a move in a language game."  Of course, he emphasizes that declarative sentences and their fact-stating uses are not the only kinds of sentences or uses.

But if we think about *sentential* representings, that is think about the *content* of representings to begin with in terms of *claimables*, *statables*, the picture of appearance and reality looks quite different.  The argument from illusion is less tempting.
For this model does not encourage and enforce the idea that what exists *in* representings *as* representable cannot also simply exist.  For the sentential contents *expressed* by sentential representings, the statables or claimables, can also be *true*, state *facts*.

17

We are not invited, it is certainly not obligatory, to think of this in terms of the existence of a kind of object—either *in* the representing or *in* the world.

Facts are *stated*. When the stating is true, the statable that is stated is a fact.

There are two kinds of representings-as-statings: true ones and ones that are not true.

This version of veridicality, in terms of the truth of some claimables rather than two kinds of existence of objects, does not wall off appearance (representings as expressing statables) from reality (the facts).

Sellars thinks that we will not find the key to understanding claimings as expressing appearances of what there really is at the level of *sentential contents*. For he thinks all such are ultimately metalinguistic, and so not to be found in the world in the narrow, discourse-(reference)-independence sense. (I will contest this, in Week 13, when I present my alternative story in terms of rational forms = conceptual contents as roles w/res to reason relations at the sentential level, and bimodal hylomorphic conceptual realism as understood in *RfLLfR*.) So any story about how conceptual contents are appearances *of* what there really is *must*, for him, take place at the level of terms and worldly particulars. That is reason enough for him to want to revive the older notion of <u>containment</u>, and to work in a framework emphasizing the *existence* of *objects* (particulars), contained in two different kinds of container: representings (appearances) and the represented world (reality). This contrasts with working in a framework that understands conceptual contents in terms of *claimables* (propositions), which can either show up *subjectively* in the *attitudes* of practitioners (what they *take* to be *true*) or in the real world as facts (= true claimables).

<u>Comparing term/object-kind of existence models and sentence/fact-status models</u>:

What I am interested in is the idea that thinking in terms of *objects* and their modes of existence sets up the highest-common-factor analysis that is integral to the argument from illusion, and that this line of thought can be avoided by starting with *sentential* contents.

I think I can see how distinguishing two modes of existence of represented objects, *simple* existence and existence *qua* represented (existence in reality and existence in appearance) sets up the mistaken line of thought that leads via highest-common-factor to the argument from illusion, which is denied by disjunctivism.

The challenge then is to see how and why this line of thought breaks down, or some steps become unattractive, when we start with *sentential* contents.

Terms (purport to) refer to objects, which simply exist or not.

The mistake, I think, must be treating the representing of an object that does not exist (simply) as a kind of existence of the object: "in appearance", "as contained in a representing", "as a representable."

Now we can treat a taking-true as the *appearance* of a fact.

But if, instead of "representings of objects" we think of appearances as purported or aspirational fact-statings, we have two kinds of statables: those *taken*-true and those that *are* true.

These seem like two statuses statables can have.

But it should be clear that the *very same* statable can have *both* statuses: be *taken* true and *be* true.

The invocation of *truth* here is an artefact of the need to generalize (Quine's "semantic ascent"). We mean all the instances of "S claims (believes) that-*p* and *p*," such as "S claims (believes) that the frog is on the log, and the frog is on the log."

But, in the end, what is the important, distinctive difference between:

Treating objects as having two possible modes of existence: one in (simple) reality and the other (as contained) in representings, and

Treating statables-claimables-believables as having two possible statuses: one as facts (in reality) and the other as the contents expressed by statings, claimings, believings (their cognitive appearances)?

The statables etc. are not stat*ings*, but are *expressed by* such statings.

We speak naturally about them as *contents* of statings (claimings, believings).

They are stat*ables*, claim*ables*, believ*ables*.

We can say that in veridical cases it is the *very same* claimable that is claimed and that is true— but we can say that in veridical cases it is the *very same* object that is in the representing as a representable and simply exists.

In that latter case, what simply exists is not the object *as represented*, however.

Whereas in the sentential-content case, it *is* the statable *as stated* (claimed, believed) that is true, is a fact.

Thought of in terms of the argument from illusion, the "highest common factor" of veridical and non-veridical perceivings is the object *as represented*-representable.

Since we can't tell veridical from nonveridical representings, it is concluded that what is "contained in" the representings is the same in both cases. *Qua* represented-representable, *none* of the represented objects simply exist, for they are all of the same kind, all on a par.

That is the source of, the argument for, the conclusion that even in veridical cases, the object as represented-representable does not and cannot exist simply. At most *it*, the content of representings as such, can be *correlated with* something that exists simply. We could express that correlation by saying that it is the same object, but without simple existence, having only representational existence, existence *in* representings.

Is an argument of that form harder to mount for the sentential case—and if so, why?

The "highest common factor" of veridical and nonveridical statings-claimings is their sentential content, what is stated-claimed or better statable-claimable. The fact that we can't tell which of our statings-claimings are veridical does not show that some of them are not true, hence facts.

It just means that we can't tell which of our **purported fact-statings** succeed.

Compare: we can't tell which of our **purported referrings-to-existents** succeed.  That does not mean that some of them don't.  That is what we *should* say about the singular terms in the argument-from-illusion appearance-as-existence-of-objects-*in*-representations view.

That we *can* say this even at the term-object level is a consequence of having a better, top-down understanding of the function of (putatively referring) terms in sentences, that does not require thinking of the objects referred to as existing "in" the sentential representing.  There is just referring term and referent.  (Alert: object-involving uses of singular terms—e.g. some demonstratives—show the situation is more complicated than this suggests.)

Somehow the two-kinds-of-existence-of-objects setting has precluded, or at least steered us away from that sensible conclusion.

<u>Why are we talking and thinking about all this stuff?</u>

Most proximally, because Sellars is pretty much going to ignore the second, more modern (post-Kantian) approach—though in *this* sense, Carnap is not a post-Kantian modern, either. He, too, thinks of logical empiricists as nominalists, because they are materialist naturalists.
And the question is to what extent it is a good move for Sellars to stick with and try to develop the two-kinds-of-existence-of-objects picture of representation, intentionality, and the appearance/reality distinction in its representational form. What justifications or good consequences are there for deploying these concepts as a way of understanding things?

I have indicated that at the center of Sellars's metaphysics is his *ontological nominalism*, his claim that only what can be referred to by proper *terms* (singular, but also sortal) really exists.

The topic of *SM* is to map the *appearance/reality* distinction, in particular as it appears in Kant's transcendental idealism, onto the *common-sense conceptual scheme / conceptual scheme of an eventual science* distinction.

On the face of it, that would seem to have nothing to do with ontological nominalism.
Is there a connection?

Yes. It is Sellars's nominalism in the metaphysics of intentionality that forges the connection.
And Sellars insists that he is following Kant in this regard too.
About this, I agree that Sellars is picking up *one strand* of Kant's thought.
But just as he rejects the *Tractatus*'s world-of-facts view, and view that the picturing relation holds between linguistic facts and nonlinguistic facts, he rejects Kant's privileging of the propositional, his taking it that *judgeables* are the most basic units of conceptual contentfulness.
That Big Kantian Idea is in some tension with the objects "contained in representations", underwriting a *disjoining* of the two "kinds of existence of objects" in the principle that nothing that exists *in* representations or *as* representable ("objective existence") can also simply exist.

In Chapter I of *SM*, Sellars has understood intuitions as conceptually contentful ("there is only one unity" synthesizing intuitions and judgments), and as having the nonpropositional conceptual form of "this-suches", e.g. "this cube".
That is the form of what exists *in* intuitive representations.
And it is things of that *nominalist* form—"this-suches" are picked out as such by noun-phrases—that will ultimately stand in picturing relations with *representings* having the "this-such" form.
That is, the worldly this-suches are pictured by this-suches *in* representings. (Interestingly, in this case, not *just* in represent*ables*. Picturing requires *actual* represent*ings*, that is, ones that exist *simply* but as represent*ings*—not as represent*ables*. For it is those that can be isomorphic to the thus-suches that populate Sellars's nominalistic real world (the world in the narrow sense).

So I would like to better understand the nominalist strand in Sellars's thought by understanding its role in his metaphysics of intentionality: his account of the relations between representings-appearances and representeds-realities, taking over the two-kinds-of-existence-of-objects model and *at some level* (transcendentally, at the non-semantic level of picturing), while for that picturing relation re-establishing the possibility of the MI object that is *in* representings, and so is an appearance, not being a *mere* appearance, but an appearance *of* something (a material object) that is real, in that it appears in the material world as some eventual natural science describes it.

Sellars has a number of specifications of the real in play, contrasting with some corresponding notion of appearance.  The big ones are:

(1) The world in the narrow sense, of being reference-independent of all discursive activity—in that sense, the world as it is "in itself," rather than "as it appears to us";

(2) The material world as described in eventual *natural science*.  This is a *different* conception of the world of things as they are "in themselves"—the one he wants to understand as a development of Kant's transcendental idealism.

(3) A world structured as things (objects, particulars) rather than facts.  A world that should not be understood as including *abstracta* (thought of as a kind of thing that exists only *in* representations, *as* representable?), universals, kinds, or propositions (which, when true, are facts).  Here the contrast is with appearance as what is *meta*linguistic—or anyway as the metalinguistic as an important class of things that exist only *in* representings, not in the represented things as they are "in themselves."

The nominalistic (3) fits well with (1), since what is metalinguistic is dependent on the discursive activities involved in the object-language(s) that it is a metavocabulary for, and so cannot qualify as in the world in the narrow, discourse-independent, sense.

**III.     From Truth to Correspondence of Appearance with Reality**

3.       Truth and Reference a matter of Semantics: Metalinguistic Inferences,
            So Cannot be the Connection between Appearance and Reality.

4.       Matter-of-Factual *Picturing*:  of Constellations of Nonlinguistic Particulars
                                    by Constellations of Linguistic Particulars


Passages from "Truth and Correspondence"


10.      For, as has often been noted, the formula
         'Snow is white' (in our language) is true $\Leftrightarrow$ Snow is white
is viewed with the greatest equanimity by pragmatist and coherentist alike.  [29]


11.      My topic, therefore, can be given a provisional formulation as follows: Is there a sense of
'correspond' other than that explicated by semantic theory, in which empirical truths correspond
to objects or events in the world?  [30]


12.      Let us begin with the question: Does truth pertain primarily to forms of words such as
would correctly be said to express propositions or to the propositions they would be said to
express?  [32]


13.      I share the conviction that there is an important sense in which the truth of propositions is
prior to the truth of the forms of words…[32]


14.      Thus our provisional interpretation of the meaning statement is
         S (in L) corresponds to 'Chicago is large' in the language we are speaking.
…The 'correspondence is a correspondence of *use*, or, as I prefer to say, role…
There are degrees of likeness of meaning and meaning statements are to be construed as having a
tacit rider to the effect that the correspondence is in a relevant respect and to a relevant degree.
[35]


15.      It seems to me that the distinguishing feature of conceptual roles is their relation to
inference.  [35-6]


16.      …what we have here is the principle of inference:
         That snow is white is true entails and is entailed by
                 That snow is white
Which governs such inferences as
         That snow is white is true.

So, Snow is white.

But if the word 'true' gets its sense from this type of inference, we must say that, instead of standing for a relation or relational property of statements… 'true' is a sign that *something is to be done*—for inferring is a doing.  [38]

17.  (1)  *S* (in L) pictures *aRb*.

…If we interpret (1) as having the sense of

  (1')  *S* (in L) *means aRb*

As we have explicated this form, we can make consistent sense of *three* ideas: (a) that elementary statements picture facts; (b) that '*aRb*' does *not* occur in the "ladder language" formula (1) (or rather, occurs in a peculiar way); and (c) that "ladder language" statements are "statements" only in that broad sense in which statements can contain such words as 'shall' or 'ought' or 'correct'.  [40]

18.  In the passages with which we have been concerned, Wittgenstein has been…conceiving picturing as a relation between facts about linguistic expressions, on the one hand, and facts about nonlinguistic objects, on the other.  [43]

19.  But what if, instead of construing "picturing" as a relationship between *facts*, we construe it as a relationship between linguistic and nonlinguistic *objects*?...

  1. If picturing is to be a relation between objects in the natural order, this means that the linguistic objects in question must also belong to the natural order…Specifically, although we may, indeed must, know that these linguistic objects are subject to rules and principles—are **fraught with "ought"**—we abstract from this knowledge in considering them as objects in the natural order.
  2. We must be careful *not* to follow Wittgenstein's identification of complex objects with facts.  [44]

20.  In the following argument I shall draw heavily on a principle…The principle is as follows:  Although to say of something that it *ought* to be done (or *ought not* to be done) in a certain kind of circumstance is not to say that *whenever* the circumstance occurs it *is* done (or *isn't* done), the statement that a person or group of people think of something as something that ought (or ought not) to be done in a certain kind of circumstance entails that *ceteris paribus* they actually *do* (or refrain from doing) the act in question when the circumstance occurs….

I shall put the principle briefly as follows: Espousal of principles is reflected in uniformities of performance.  [48]

21.  The uniformities to which I am calling particular attention fall into two categories:

  1. Statement-statement.  These are uniformities that correspond a the overt level to espoused principles of inference….

2. Situation-statement. These are uniformities of the kind illustrated by the person who, in the presence of a green object in standard conditions, thinks, roughly, "Green here now"…

A more elaborate discussion would require mention of a third category of uniformities, involving a transition from statement to situation…[49]

22.     What Hume saw, put in terminology reasonably close to his own, was that "natural inference" supplements "recall" and "observation" to generate a growing system of "vivid ideas," which constitute a "likeness" (sketchy though it may be) of the world in which we live. [50]

23.     Let us suppose…that observation reports have the forms illustrated by
        This here now is green
        This is one step to the right of that
        This is one heartbeat after that
And let us imagine a super-inscriber who "speaks" by inscribing statements in wax and is capable of inscribing inscriptions at an incredible rate, indefinitely many "at once." [52]

24.     The next step is to take into account the fact that our inscriber is, in the full sense, a rational being…Let us imagine that, whatever the form of the reasoning by which one infers from the occurrence of an observed event of one kind to the occurrence of an unobserved event of another…it finds its expression at the inscriptional level in a sequence of two inscriptions, the former of which described the observed event, while the latter describes the inferred event. [54]

25.     If it is objected that to speak of a linguistic structure as a *correct* projection is to use normative language and, therefore, to violate the terms of the problem, which was to define 'picturing' as a relation *in rerum natura*, the answer is that, while to say of a projection that it is *correct* is, indeed, to use normative language, the principle which, it will be remembered, I am taking as axiomatic assures us that corresponding to every espoused principle of correctness there is a matter-of-factual uniformity of performance. [55]

26.     To bring this exploration to an end, the following remarks may serve to highlight the larger-scale structure of the argument:
    1. The correspondence for which we have been looking is limited to elementary statements…
    2. The foregoing can be construed as an attempt to explain the fundamental kind of role played by matter-of-factual statements…
    3. …the roles of different kinds of statements are different.  My argument is that, in the case of matter-of-factual statements…this role is that of constituting a projection in language users of the world in which they live. [55]

27.     …if to understand a language involves knowing (though not at the level of philosophical reflection) that uniformities such as were described in the myth of the perfect inscriber are involved in the use of language and if, therefore, I recognize (though not at the level of philosophical reflection) that, to the extent to which roles are executed and rules conformed to, statements are complex objects in a system that is a picture of natural events, surely I must recognize in my statement '/9,7/ is green' the projection of the object /9,7/. [56]